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Abstract: South Africa is a leading example of democracy in Africa though many argue that it has 
lost its way in meaningful aspects ranging from practice of its majority rule, social cohesion, and neo-
liberalisation of its political economy and international diplomacy. South Africa could fairly be 
viewed as an emerging middle power but many of its actions have belied this by allowing certain 
analysts to consider it as inconsistent, confusing, and even sinister. Some of the core problematic 
areas of South African democracy include poverty, unemployment, inequality, high level of 
HIV/AIDS, corruption, fast decaying educational system, electricity (load) shedding, fast loss of rand 
value in the international market and rampant strike actions, especially in the mining industry. 
However, this paper depends on the documentary method of research to examine the drama 
surrounding the security upgrade of the President’s home at Nkandla. The findings show that in a 
democratic society like South Africa, majority rule may sometimes be a limitation of democratic 
practices. In order to avert the dangers majority rule may pose to the other principles of democracy, 
the principles of values, such as separation of power among the three levels of government and rule of 
law, must be respected. 
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1. Introduction 
The apparent inconsistencies keenly displayed in the political practices of majority 
rule, social cohesion application, and neo-liberalisation of its economy and 
international diplomacy, has earned South Africa an image that analysts largely 
describe as directionless. Yet, despite its tempestuous actions viewed as confusing 
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and even sinister by some, it is still considered a leading example of democracy in 
Africa and associated with prestigious emerging market accolades (Fourie, 2013). 
Many analysts have argued that South Africa transformed its horrific history of 
discrimination, racism and legal apartheid rule to a beacon of human rights at 
global level, but not without limitations (see Sidiropoulos & Hughes, 2004; Fourie, 
2013). For example, the immigration policy configuration for African immigrants 
has been a subject of critical scrutiny, especially in the wake of the scourge of 
xenophobic attacks on African foreigners in 2008 and 2014 respectively (see 
Umezurike & Isike, 2013; Umezurike, 2015). In a more general context, South 
African democratic governance has generally passed through several trials into 
diverse directions: some of the core problematic areas of South African democracy 
include poverty, unemployment, inequality, high level of HIV/AIDS, corruption, 
decaying educational system, electricity shedding, fast loss of rand value in the 
international market and rampant strike especially in the mining industry (see 
Andreasson, 2010; Ncube, Shimeles & Chouchane, 2012). 
However, our contention in this study is the complex situation that developed in the 
political system of the country following the investigation and report of the security 
upgrade of President Jacob Zuma’s residence at Nkandla by the Public Protector, 
Thuli Madonsela. The investigation and report have exposed several weaknesses in 
the South African democracy: ranging from the dangers of one dominant political 
party - exemplified by African National Congress (ANC) - to the strength of 
majority rule as both a major shortfall and advantage of democracy in any context. 
Despite the concerns raised in the private and public sector on the implications of 
the crises of the security upgrade at Nkandla’ - homestead of President Zuma - 
there has not been comprehensive literature that attempts to analyse the impact of 
the crises on South Africa’s nascent democracy. This paper seeks to fill the 
identified gap in literature, drawing on the available document on South African 
democracy covering the period 1994 to 2016. The research questions to be 
answered in this study include: How do democracy and majority rule affect justice? 
What are the challenges in deploying majority rule in a democracy? What are the 
implications of the first and second research questions on the South African 
democracy? In order to answer these research questions, we explore the crises that 
arose from the security upgrade of President Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla to 
expose how the rule of law and in fact,  government institutions can be ridiculed to 
protect the interests of those whom the majority rule have put in power. This paper 
therefore uses the documentary analysis method of research to argue that the 
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handling of the crises of the Nkandla security upgrade in South Africa is a major 
negation of the hopes that the minority placed on the South African democracy, 
since the majority does not necessarily uphold constitutionalism or rule of law. 
The paper consists of nine sections: the introduction, objective of the study and 
methodology to inform the reader of the issue under investigation and the 
methodology used to conduct the research. Next is a section on literature review 
which centers on understanding democracy and majority rule, which 
conceptualizes democracy and majority rule in the South African context, 
thereafter the long investigation of the Nkandla security upgrade, which presents a 
focused discussion and analysis of the investigation of President Zuma’s home 
security upgrade. The other sections include Cabinet and the Public Protector’s 
Investigation and Report, which looks at the President and his cabinet’s attempt to 
undermine the report; Parliament and the Public Protector’s Investigation and 
Report discussion on Parliament’s attempt to undermine the report and the Public 
Protector’s independence of office; the constitutional court judgment provides 
thorough interpretation of the implication of the Apex Court’s (Constitutional 
Court) ruling on the Nkandla security upgrade and its effect on the South African 
democracy and finally we draw conclusions based on the analysis of the entire 
discussion. 
Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study is to use documentary analysis method of research to 
examine the implications of application of majority rule to democracy and good 
governance in South Africa exploring the crises of the ‘security upgrade at 
Nkandla’ - homestead of President Zuma as a case study. 
 
2. Methodology 
As stated earlier, this paper relies on documentary analysis method of research. 
This method allows researchers to select documents that are relevant to the study 
for the purpose of analysis (Payne & Payne, 2004; Mogalakwe, 2006). This method 
of research enables researchers to determine the documents that are relevant to the 
study based on their significance to the subject under investigation. Dey (2005, p. 
105) suggests that in documentary analysis method of research, the basis for 
choosing documents is dependent on necessary extracts which has to be relevant to 
the subjects being investigated by the researcher. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                   Vol. 10, no. 1/2017 
   82 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Understanding Democracy and Majority Rule 
Democracy means different things to different people, but the common thread is 
still human involvement in the decision-making and governance processes. 
Therefore, it is commonplace to use democracy to design different forms of 
government, especially where the citizens of the country are involved in the 
decision-making process - be it in ancient or modern times. For Fox and Meyer 
(1995, p. 35), democracy is a political system where the decision-making power 
and process are shared among the citizens of a country. Malan (2014, p. 55) asserts 
that the complex nature of modern society makes it impossible for citizens to make 
direct decisions owing to the use of elected representatives who make decisions on 
their behalf. Therefore, democracy could be direct or indirect, depending on the 
level of people’s involvement. The common view of analysts is that direct 
democracy is where there is absolute direct involvement of the citizenry in the 
decision-making process, while indirect democracy gives people the opportunity to 
periodically elect into power those who represent them in the decision-making 
process. In a direct democratic setting, it is common for the citizens to sit together 
and enact new laws or change the already existing laws, if necessary. In a 
representative democracy - such as South African since 1994 - the citizens usually 
elect their leaders periodically to take decisions concerning the laws, (see Cloete, 
2012, p. 19). 
However, any democracy is highly dependent upon certain basic principles 
including majority rule. Khalo (2008, p. 67) is of the view that democracy is a form 
of government where the state is governed by the majority of its population: this 
suggests that in a democracy, majority rules over minority. This is common among 
democracies in the world because decisions are made based on numbers. However, 
some measures are usually established to protect minority view. For example, in 
any democracy the hope of the minority is usually to follow the legitimate means 
provided by the constitution to contest issues. More often than not, the constitution 
provides for separation of powers thus the executive arm, the parliament and the 
judiciary forms the three arms of government but each operates as distinctive 
government institutions while interrelating in operations. The hope of the minority 
view is usually anchored in the judiciary: in any modern democracy, the judiciary 
is charged with the responsibility of interpretation of law or law adjudication. In 
order to come out clearer in the understanding of the basic tenets of democracy, we 
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share the views of Theletsane, (2014) that, contrary to the views expressed by some 
academics, democracy cannot have more than one meaning. Theletsane, (2014) 
further argues, in line with Fringpong (1999), that even if there are different 
interpretations of democracy, there are certain underlying factors that must be 
consistent within any such interpretation. Among such underlying factors, and 
drawing from the works of Fringpong (1999); Gildenhuys and Knip, (2012, pp. 
111-112); Theletsane, (2014); Madue, Tsolo, and Ramoabi, (2014), are the 
following: 
1. The rule of law and constitutionalism must be practised; 
2.  The will of the people/majority are respected; 
3.  Citizen’s participation is essential and encouraged; 
4. Citizen’s participation is exercised periodically in free and fair elections through 
which elected representatives assume leadership positions; 
5. The government is established in power only for the purpose of serving the 
citizens; 
6. The government is subject to the power of the people who should be able to 
remove the government in terms of constitutional provision;  
7. Separation of the powers, based on checks and balances, should be contained in 
the constitution and respected; 
8. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the 
constitution. 
The bottom line is that democracy as a concept is a slippery slope and is an idea 
that may not be expected to be attainable as an end-goal in a society. However, its 
practice requires that the central principles highlighted as tenets of democracy 
apply to the lives of the majority in the country (see Theletsane, 2014). In a 
democratic setting, majority is a crucial factor in decision-making and could be 
seen as one of the attributes of democracy that guarantees stability in a country. It 
is so largely because application of the majority rule may easily suppress the 
opinion of the minority, who may rightfully, view such suppression as a 
compromise or defeat. In the next section, we turn to the long investigation of the 
security upgrade of President Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla.  
3.2 The Investigation of the Security Upgrade of President Zuma’s Homestead 
at Nkandla 
Nkandla is the hometown and birthplace of the President of South Africa, Jacob 
Zuma, and it is situated south of KwaZulu-Natal. Nkandla has been surrounded by 
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controversy, owing to the alleged dubious escalations of the cost of the security 
upgrade. However, the drama of Nkandlagate actually started to unfold after it was 
reported that the upgrade included several outlandish and non-security additions to 
the private property. Some of these unrelated additions include a helipad, 
amphitheatre, underground bunkers, a swimming pool, a chicken run, visitors' 
center and a military hospital (Madonsela, 2014). The saga shows that the 
Department of Public Works ignored the provision in the ministerial hand book 
that it may expend not more than R100, 000 on security improvements at the 
private houses of public officials (see Ministerial Hand Book, 2007). According to 
the ministerial hand book any improvements exceeding that amount shall be at the 
expense of such public official but in this case over R246 million was allocated for 
the homestead renovation (South African history online, 2014).  
According to the Minister of Public Works (2013), upgrades to the Nkandla 
homestead only began on the 29th of August, 2009. Apparently on 13 December 
2011 and 12 December 2012 respectively, formal complaints were lodged at the 
office of Public Protector both from private citizens and opposition parties, in 
particular the Democratic Alliance (DA). More importantly, the investigation was 
conducted partly in terms of the provisions of Section 182 of the constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (see 1996, South African Constitution). Public Protector, 
Thuli Madonsela's final report on security upgrades to the compound was titled 
‘Secure in comfort’ and it was officially published on 19 March 2014 (Wilson, 
2014).  
3.3 Cabinet and the Public Protector’s Investigation and Report 
The first attempt by the ANC to undermine the saga at the executive level appeared 
to be the initial calculated move by the Department of Public Works to deny the 
existence of any such project at Nkandla. The department later admitted that the 
security upgrade was indeed ongoing but that it was duly declared a National Key 
Point in line with Act 102 of 1980 applicable to the project (National Key Points 
Act 102 of 1980).1 Another indication that the ruling party and its leadership 
wanted to undermine the investigation of the Public Protector appeared on 13 
                                                     
1 If it appears to the Minister at any time that any place or area is so important that its loss, damage, 
disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic, or whenever he considers it necessary or 
expedient for the safety of the Republic or in the public interest, he may declare that place or area a 
National Key Point. The owner of any place or area so declared a National Key Point shall forthwith 
be notified by written notice of such declaration. The minister of police is responsible for 
implementation of national key point act 102 of 1980. 
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January 2013, when the Public Protector informed the President of her being 
unable to conclude the investigation in 30 days as stipulated in Section 3(2) of the 
Executive Members' Ethics Act (Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998). 
This provision of the section stipulates that the Public Protector’s report is due at 
the end of the 30 days; if not completed within 30 days, the Public Protector must 
submit a report when the investigation is completed. The President and his legal 
team pounced on the opportunity to question the validity of any report prepared by 
the Public Protector not concluded within the 30 days (Executive Members' Ethics 
Act 82 of 1998). The President, along with his legal team, indicated to the Public 
Protector that she should provide evidence whether the President has power to 
condone any Public Protector’s non-compliance of section 3(2) of the Executive 
Members' Ethics Act (Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998). This appeared 
to be an attempt to undermine chapter 9 of the South African constitution that 
provides for the democratic institutions in South Africa which the Public Protector 
represents (see 1996 South African Constitution). 
The government’s security cluster ministers (ministers of defence, police, home 
affairs and international relations) raised security questions based on the conclusion 
of the investigation. The Public Protector was eventually taken to court on 8 
November 2013, on the grounds that the security cluster ministers were not given 
enough time and opportunity to study the initial report before the final report was 
released; the cluster ministers later withdrew the case (SABC Online News, 2013). 
In the view of many, this was interpreted as an attempt to frustrate the Public 
Protector because it may be questionable why it is necessary for the cluster 
ministers to study the preliminary report before its final publication. This could 
possibly raise questions over impartiality or credibility of the report while at the 
same time compromising the independence of the office of the Public Protector.   
In another move to justify the renovations, the Public Works Minister Thulas 
Nxesi, on 19 December 2013, presented an inter-ministerial task team report as 
evidence that South African public expenditure cleared the President of any wrong 
doing for the security upgrade in his homestead. The question arises: should such 
clearance supersede the investigation of the Public Protector’s remedial action and 
findings? This would have cleared the way for the executive to have its way on any 
issue in the political system of South Africa and unlimited power for the President 
responsible for the appointment of the cabinet members. The need for the provision 
of democratic institutions in Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution cannot be 
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over-emphasized, especially because of the need to keep the President in check 
from exerting absolute and arbitrary power in government. On the 11th of August 
2014, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) was mandated by President Zuma to 
investigate the security improvement of his home and the Public Protector’s report 
(SABC Online News, 2014). At a certain point, it emerged that SIU was suing the 
architect (Mr. M. Makhanya) in charge of the security improvement of Nkandla for 
R155.3 million in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court (SABC Online News, 2014); it 
was a successful diversion from all the institutions, persons and public involved in 
the matter. Suing an independent businessman who has no access to public fund 
expenditure would have little effect on the causal matter. Even if the over-spending 
was as a result of his quotation, it also provided evidence that South African 
procurement procedures were not followed in the security upgrade. SIU’s report on 
the matter was brought before Parliament on 12 September, 2014 (Nhleko, 2015) 
which noted that Zuma’s family did not unduly benefit from the upgrades, thus 
contradicting the report of the Public Protector which asserted that the President 
and his family unduly benefited from the security upgrade (Mahomed, 2015). The 
unit shifted blame of overspending to the architect who worked on the project and 
the public works officials. The report also reiterated that the security upgrade in the 
President’s homestead was still inadequate despite the overspending, a further 
indication of the recklessness of the Department of Public Works in the handling of 
the project. 
In President Zuma’s letter to the Public Protector, dated 11 September 2014, he 
proclaimed his disagreement with the Public Protector’s assertion that, by law, her 
report is not subject to any review or second-guessing by any minister or cabinet 
member (Zuma, 2014); his view was that the findings or remedial actions by the 
Public Protector are not final by law. The Public Protector made it clear earlier that 
it was only the court that could review remedial actions she recommends; this was 
later upheld by the Constitutional Court of South Africa.  
The Minister of Police, Nkosinathi Nhleko, on 28 May 2015, released a report on 
the security upgrade of the homestead, reiterating that the swimming pool, the 
cattle kraal, the chicken run, visitor's centre and amphitheatre were necessary 
security requirements for the President. The Minister of Police drew the conclusion 
that President Zuma was not obliged to refund South Africans any money because 
of those features, formally concluding: 
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As the Minister assigned to make a determination on the security upgrades of the 
president’s homestead at Nkandla and having paid due consideration to the facts 
given, provided evidence that points to the questionable features, namely the 
animal enclosure (cattle kraal and/or goat kraal with culvert and chicken run), fire 
pool (swimming pool), soil retention wall, amphitheater and visitors’ centre as 
security features that are in accordance with the physical security requirements 
and/or interest (Nhleko, 2015). 
We argue that from the inception of the security upgrade in President Zuma’s 
homestead, through the investigation of the matter by the Public Protector and all 
the debate over her report, the leadership of the ANC knew that many anomalies 
existed and chose to capitalize on its majority in Parliament. Thus, the party’s 
leadership tossed around with executive powers and its majority rule in Parliament 
to protect the President. For example, with the majority of ANC in Parliament it 
was certain that the opposition may not be able to impeach the President and the 
Speaker of Parliament thus holding majority of the seats in Parliament. ANC 
members were adamantly rebuffing the attacks on the President, including the 
signal jamming of all devices during the debates in Parliament. Our view is that, 
with ANC holding a little above 62% of the seats in the current SA National 
Assembly, it is certain that the opposition working together may never be able to 
secure the 2/3 majority required for the impeachment of the President or Speaker of 
the Parliament. The ANC trusts its internal cohesion that its members will stay 
together in defense of President Zuma while confident in the certainty that the 
opposition in national assembly cannot garner up to the 50% vote of parliamentary 
members required to pass a vote of no confidence on the President.  
The next section examines the role of Parliament in the protection of the now 
infamously scandalous security upgrade at Nkandla. 
3.4 Parliament and the Public Protectors Investigation and Report 
On 28 April 2014, a parliamentary ad hoc committee set up to consider Zuma's 
response to the Public Protector’s report was referred to the incoming Parliament 
that was to be in place after the 2014 South African general elections; 7 May, 2014 
was set for the general elections (Parliament, 2014). A second parliamentary ad hoc 
committee was established in August, 2014 to consider the report of the following: 
the inter-ministerial task team released in December 2013, the Public Protector’s' 
final report released in March 2014 and the SIU's report published in September 
2014 along with Zuma's responses to each of them (Azzakani, 2014). The second 
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ad hoc committee challenged the findings of the Public Protector and referred the 
matter to security experts, including the Minister of Police, in November 2014. 
Our view is that the ANC uses its majority in parliament to protect the chief 
executive and the cabinet members. For example, why would it be necessary for 
the ad hoc committee to consider other views and reports that had been used by the 
executive to attempt to circumvent/manipulate the findings and remedial actions 
outlined by the Public Protector? It is also clear in chapter 9 section 182 (1) that the 
Public Protector has the power to make or enforce remedial action (1996 South 
African Constitution). In the Public Protector’s letter to the president she stressed 
that by law it is only the judiciary that has the power to set aside her findings and 
remedial action. Again, in our view, it would have been more logical for the ANC 
to approach the Constitutional Court to interpret the findings and remedial course 
recommended by the Public Protector and subsequently determine whether the 
findings and remedial course of the Public Protector were final. Rather than to go 
through the judiciary, the ANC chose to invoke ‘majority rule’ in parliament.  
On 18 August 2015, the National Assembly adopted the report of a third 
parliamentary ad hoc committee which accepted the findings of Nxesi and Nhleko 
and cleared Zuma of any wrong doing (ENCA Online News, 2015). This move was 
meant to conclude the case, irrespective of the views of the opposition parties in 
parliament. To set aside the findings of the Public Protector on such a scandalous 
case involving the homestead of the chief executive was viewed as an attempt to 
set a poor precedent in the South African democracy. The second-guessing of ANC 
majority was evident in the controlling executive arm of government and 
parliament. It was separation of powers that prevailed over majority, though the 
success was limited since the Constitutional Court claimed that it has no powers to 
remove Zuma or order an impeachment, largely because of the principles of 
separation of powers among the three branches of government. 
The two main opposition parties in parliament, the Democratic Alliance and the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) held the view that both the president and the 
Speaker of Parliament must respect and act in favour of the Public Protector’s 
report. In fact, from the second quarter of 2014, EFF’s approach was even more 
raucous as it demanded that the President pay the money spent on his Nkandla 
residence (South African History Online, 2015). In August of 2014, the EFF 
adopted a popular slogan, ‘pay back the money’ in response to President Zuma’s 
unwillingness to speak on the Nkandla scandal (South African History Online, 
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2015). The State of the Nation Address of President Zuma on 12 February 2015 
will be remembered as one of the most controversial breaches of parliamentary 
rules in South African history. Before the State of the Nation Address, the EFF 
members of parliament warned that they will raise the issue of Nkandla and would 
request that the president indicates when he would ‘pay back the money’. EFF 
members were eventually removed from parliament during the address on the 
instruction issued by the speaker who considered their continuous chanting of the 
slogan ‘pay back the money’ as disruptive (Mail & Guardian, 2015). Following the 
allegation that the ‘security officials’ who forcefully removed EFF members were 
in fact undercover policemen who broke parliamentary rules, the DA’s members 
walked out in protest (South African History Online, 2015). COPE members of 
parliament had earlier walked away from the sitting in protest that they will not 
listen to a president who had confessed to breaching the constitution which he 
swore to protect.  
3.5 The Constitutional Court Decision – The Final Hit 
The opposition parties in Parliament were frustrated at the ruling party’s (ANC) 
choice of settling the matter within cabinet and Parliament where it has executive 
and majority advantage respectively over all the other political parties joined 
together. The most aggressive among the opposition parties, the EFF, went to the 
Constitutional Court to challenge the Speaker of the National Assembly, President 
of the Republic of South Africa and others for their roles in negating the 
implementation of the Public Protector’s report on the security upgrade of Zuma’s 
homestead (see Notice of Motion, 2015). The Public Protector and DA later joined 
hands with the EFF. The hearing date of the case was 09 February 2016, while the 
date of judgment delivery was 31 March 2016, (News24, 2016). The most 
important aspect of the Constitutional Court judgment was on whether the Public 
Protector has powers to ‘take appropriate remedial action’ or whether her findings 
constituted merely a recommendation that could be set aside by the President, 
cabinet members or Parliament using executive power or parliamentary majority. 
For example, whether her remedial action requiring President Zuma to pay back a 
reasonable portion of the money spent installing non-security upgrades at his 
private homestead at Nkandla in his personal capacity was binding on the 
President. 
The view of opposition parties in Parliament had been in agreement with the Public 
Protector’s report and supported the remedial action ordering the president, with 
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the assistance of the South African Police Service and National Treasury, to 
determine the reasonable costs of those features and repay a reasonable portion 
thereof to the State (Public Protector’s report, 2014). 
The Speaker of the National Assembly, Minister of Police and President had 
argued that the Public Protector’s power to take remedial action merely amounted 
to recommendations and therefore was not binding on the President - or anyone - 
until another appropriate authority has acted on the report (Zuma, 2014). As a 
matter of fact before the hearing, the President had argued that the steps he took 
were in compliance with the Public Protector’s remedial action. The steps taken by 
the president included referring the investigation and report of the Public Protector 
to the Minister of Police, SIU and National Assembly via ad hoc committees who 
all shared the same view. The opposition parties and Public Protector have 
maintained that the investigation, report and all other processes followed by 
President Zuma in the matter were unlawful, for example, Congress of People’s 
(COPE) withdrawal from the activities of the ad hoc committee on the grounds of 
its illegality is another clear point against ANC’s attempt to use its majority in 
Parliament to protect the chief executive and cabinet members for their wrong 
doing on the security upgrade of President Zuma’s homestead.  
At the meeting of 25 September 2014, the members representing the Congress of 
the People (COPE), although not members of the committee, highlighted the 
party’s objections to the constitutionality of the committee. All other parties 
disagreed with the interpretation of COPE members of Parliament and agreed that 
the committee was indeed constitutional. The representatives of COPE then left the 
meeting stating that the party would follow the proceedings of the committee, but 
would not participate in its work (see Parliament, 2014). 
The Public Protector’s submission is that her power to take appropriate remedial 
action is final and binding and implementable except if overruled by the judiciary, 
of which President Zuma and the Speaker of House of Assembly vehemently 
opposed (see Madonsela, 2014). However during the hearing, President Zuma 
agreed that the Public Protector’s report was binding. He thereafter offered that he 
would refund a reasonable portion of the upgrade’s expenditure at his homestead 
(Pretorius, 2016). The Speaker of the National Assembly and the ANC still hold 
the view that setting up ad hoc committees and considering several reports, side by 
side with the Public Protectors report remains her lawful responsibility to put the 
actions of the executive to check (Gqirana, 2016). To date, the speaker refuses to 
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apologize to South Africans, even though the Constitutional Court ruled that her 
approach and failure to accept remedial action of the Public Protector was 
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions. Our view is that the Speaker’s 
choice was to adhere to the majority rule that her party has and to use it best in 
Parliament, that way complying with her job and the President could not be 
impeached under her leadership. The game of numbers has always been in her 
favour since she took office as Speaker of Parliament. Apparently, in a unanimous 
decision of the Constitutional Court presided over by Chief Justice, the court held 
that the Public Protector had the constitutional power to take appropriate remedial 
action which has a binding legal effect (News24, 2016). The decision of the 
President or the National Assembly speaker to respond to the binding remedial 
action taken by the Public Protector was unconstitutional since the remedial action 
can only be set aside through a proper judicial process. The court’s decision was in 
line with the position of the Public Protector’s report and stand throughout the 
saga. 
The court thus held that the National Assembly’s resolution, based on the 
Minister’s findings exonerating the President from liability, was unlawful and not 
consistent with the constitution. The court also held that, by failing to comply with 
the Public Protector’s order, the President failed to ‘uphold, defend and respect’ the 
constitution because a duty to repay the money was specifically imposed on him 
through the Public Protector’s constitutional power. The court further declared the 
conduct of the President and the National Assembly inconsistent with their 
constitutional obligations. Accordingly, the EFF and DA’s claims fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the court. The court ordered the National Treasury to 
determine the reasonable portion that the President must pay for the five non-
security items listed above and report back to the court within 60 days. The court 
ordered the President to make payment within 45 days thereafter. The President 
was also ordered to reprimand the Ministers involved in the expenditure at 
Nkandla. Finally, the court declared that the remedial action taken by the Public 
Protector is binding. The President, Minister, and Speaker were ordered to pay the 
applicants’ costs, including those of two counsels (News24, 2016). 
President Zuma apologized to South Africa for using public money to fund his 
private residence renovation, but for many his apology fell on deaf ears. The court 
ruling and President Zuma’s apology led to many prominent South Africans and 
groups, including the opposition parties, call for the resignation of the President for 
failing to uphold the constitution he swore to protect (Legalbrief, 2016). 
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Our view is that the core principles of democracy as Theletsane, (2014); 
Fringpong, (1999) outlined should be allowed to form the basis of any democracy 
if it is to thrive in a society. The principles of the rule of law and constitutionalism 
settled the case of security upgrade at Nkandla after several attempts by the ruling 
party (ANC) to use its majority to block the remedial action of the Public Protector 
on the matter. The will of the people/majority must be respected in a democracy 
and citizen participation should be encouraged. All that played out in the 
Nkandlagate was largely fuelled by people’s desire to satisfy their curiosity 
through their participation in the things that their elected representatives do or are 
meant to do. Citizen’s participation should be exercised periodically in free and fair 
elections through which elected representatives should assume leadership positions 
in society.  
In the first place, ANC has to obey the Constitutional Court ruling largely because 
it knows that it cannot afford to explain another major breaking of the law to the 
voters during election if it fails to obey the court order. The government should be 
established in power only for the purpose of serving its citizens; this core tenet of 
democracy is important and should guide elected leaders’ actions while discharging 
their responsibilities. The government should be subject to the power of the people 
who should be able to remove the government in terms of constitutional provision, 
for example through referendum or periodic elections, thus the citizens should 
exercise its voting power to choose those who will lead them. Separation of powers 
based on checks and balances especially among the three arms of government; the 
executive, legislature and judiciary, should be contained in the constitution and 
respected for example, in the case of Nkandlagate where the Speaker capitalized on 
majority and failed to check the executive actions, the judiciary was called upon by 
the minority to save the South African nascent democracy. Respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedom, as contained in the constitution, definitely 
enhances the democracy of any society. For instance, the right to information made 
it possible for people to enquire on the Nkandlagate while the right to life 
guaranteed protection from the state to all those who fought for the truth on 
Nkandlagate.  
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4. Conclusion 
There is absolutely no doubt that South Africa is a formidable example of 
democracy in its continent, although it is unlikely that it does not experience 
challenges in the application of its majority rule including in social cohesion, neo-
liberalisation of its political economy, global politics and immigration (Umezurike, 
2015). South African democracy is passing through some difficulties including 
especially poverty, unemployment, inequality, high level of HIV/AIDS, corruption, 
plummeting educational standards, electricity shedding, loss of rand value in the 
global market and rampant strikes especially in the mining industry (see 
Andreasson, 2011). 
A cause for concern is this latest Nkandlagate drama that besmirched the country 
over the past few years. The investigation and report of the Public Protector was 
highly contested in the public arena and at executive, parliamentary and judiciary 
levels. The constitutional powers of the Public Protector were challenged by both 
the President and Speaker of the National Assembly, while the Public Protector and 
the opposition parties held the view that the findings and remedial action of the 
Public Protector could not be set aside or reviewed by any other body except the 
judiciary; the President and Speaker of National Assembly’s view was that they 
were merely recommendations that could be rejected using other bodies. The 
Constitutional Court decision supported the view of the Public Protector and 
satisfied that the President and Speaker’s second guessing of the remedial action 
was a breach of the constitution. 
The practice of majority rule in a democracy does not guarantee best practice in a 
society, especially if other principles of democracy are neglected. Other principles 
of democracy that must be adhered to include the following: rule of law, 
constitutionalism, citizen’s participation in management of their affairs, periodic 
free and fair elections; government existence is to serve the citizens and people 
should be able to remove the government/leadership through legal means, 
separation of powers, checks and balances among the three arms of government 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom as outlined in the 
constitution. 
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